Technology will never save us

 

How will the city of Kabul work under Taliban rule?

Now that the Taliban is in charge, images and videos are leaking out of Taliban representatives meeting with hospital staff, bank employees and government offices. The new authorities all promote the same message, "don't quit what you are doing, just keep working, we are not here to harm or disrupt you." This sounds okay, but if we think ahead six months or two years, what will this look like?  After all, these institutions now function within networks of global finance and medical logistics. These are not isolated huts like they had in 1990s. If the Taliban does not participate within systems of global governance, these institutions will not be able to sustain themselves. So when we look at the city of Kabul, what is in store in the coming years?

For nearly 20 years, much of my career has been focused on the topic of urban planning and conflict cities.  I lived in Kabul for three years, and during that time, I provided training on city management to nearly 300 members of the city administration. I sat at the big long tables beside the Mayor of Kabul, with representatives of the World Bank, USAID, and the UN to discuss progress and gaps in urban reconstruction. I provided GIS and research services to research organizations such as CAPS and AREU. I built data with field researchers and built technical assessments, such as this report for USIP.  I also conducted novel research which I presented at the MIT Media Lab. In parallel, I travelled across Northern and Eastern Africa to bring the same expertise to problems of water distribution, conflict, environmental devastation, and youth militarization. When I see the Taliban take over, today I don't just see the present day, I see a pattern of events unfolding that will redefine daily life for everyone in Kabul.

As to how the city will organizationally operate under Taliban rule, we've seen this before. When ISIS was at the height of its power, thousands of civil servants drudged to the office everyday to do their jobs. They were not paid for weeks or months, yet they were expected to work with "business as usual." This maintained the facade of governance, but behind the current, was otherwise dependent on shadow markets. Al Shabaab operated in a slightly similar manner for many years in Somalia. This is not a true working government, it's more like the facade of a working government. If you've heard stories in the 1980s about the USSR factories creating forks, to melt them down, and create forks again - the metaphor is apt. Most of these continued operations will have little direction or impact on day-to-day life.

When the governments expect federal services to persist with no economic underpinning, creative do solutions pop up. ISIS became renown for the export and smuggling of of biblical antiquities. Shabaab was highly dependent on the export and sale of charcoal from the port of Kismaayo. In 2011, through on the ground research, I uncovered how Shabaab managed to monetize its presence within immigrant communities, acting as investors, educators, advisors, and security services. We should expect similar activities from the Taliban.

The export of heroin was a mainstay during their previous rule. The reality is that this crop just doesn't bring enough money. These men are likely willing to leverage the new institutions that have been built over the last twenty years, and thus tap into other forms of agricultural production and export already in use. Consequently, it is likely they can increase economic production far beyond the current rate within multiple sectors including animal husbandry, mineral exploration, agriculture, limited industry and banking. With China has an immediate neighbor and partner, the opportunity exists to build a thriving import/export market.  China already has a footprint within Kabul for the supply of technical expertise, and if this grows, Afghanistan will awkwardly look like a success story under Taliban rule. 

However, the new government may lack the expertise to mobilize and transition their economy. No doubt, they very likely have some PhD economists in their folds looking to introduce a new model of Sharia economics. This kind of vision is new and uncertain. The fusion of social policy with Islamic finance and global economics frameworks is nothing new - we can look to countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Qatar as proof. However, the revisionist interpretations of those policies in conflict with modern systems will create jarring outcomes.

Foremost, we should expect erratic pricing for housing in the near term, then rather static and stable market. Housing has long been a nightmare in Kabul. Conditions are poor and costs are high - for everyone. For the last twenty years, massive defensive walls have been built around the city, which additionally undermine basic business and movement.  These will remain. The loss of international money may partially stabilize the local housing market by forcing the price range to shrink with an otherwise static supply, which will be seen as a boon for the local population.

As the monetary systems erode, the "government workers" are left to do with less, but continue operating and maintaining broken infrastructure.  Yet without capital to invest in materials, replace parts, or upgrade machinery, these will rapidly deteriorate. Power outages are already common, but lack of power will become the standard, and access to electricity will be tied more heavily to bribing and relationships. Furthermore, we can expect the service sector to survive and the production of goods to drop, creating rapid inflation. Commodities like Redbull will become scarce, while locally produced goods such as vegetables and Wool will be in high supply. 

In 3-5 years, new problems will emerge. Eventually, the existing physical infrastructure will erode if international commerce is not achieved. When this happens, we can expect that presently centralized services to get broken into privatized offerings. When Mogadishu lacked a government, there was no central power grid. There was instead a fragmented patchwork of electricity providers, entrepreneurs who had large generators and offered electricity within their social network. Kabul will likely see the same.

As an exception, we can expect some forms of infrastructure to succeed. Mobile phone systems and the mobile internet access will continue to grow and proliferate. Companies such as Roshan, MTN, and Etiselat will continue to succeed in light of limited regulation and high demand. Individuals with expertise in the creation and deployment of mobile towers and information networking will have a higher demand from a smaller number of clients. Afghanistan already has nation wide software running to negate the inflow of pornography, images of Alcohol, or other related content. These systems will continue to run, but will eventually fall into disrepair, becoming less effective over time. The use of VPNs will proliferate. Finally, we must recognize that very little new physical infrastructure will be created or it will be created very slowly. The network of roads, water and sanitation systems built in the last twenty years will likely not expand. 

Projects will rarely happen - if they do, they will be done potentially with more efficiency than now because there are less obstacles to implementation under the totalitarian regime.  These physical systems will become safer and more accessible as the political landscape is now simplified. There will only be one fee to pay for road access, with far less bribes, and far less complexity among stakeholders and actors. The growth in use could fund continued maintenance and expansion, but this will be dependent on the consolidation and growth of expertise. Via ties to Pakistan, the civil engineering expertise may be in place, considering that the majority of civil engineers who built the current infrastructure were from, or educated within, Pakistan. Shabaab and ISIS maintained very aggressive tax systems under their implementation of Sharia. I expect the same in Afghanistan. The question is how those taxes will be used. 

In the end, we can expect consolidation, decay, and uneven patterns of rampant growth. Modern industries will likely thrive. Traditional industries - such as the local production of Coca-Cola - will die. Housing stock will typically not change, though access to housing will improve. There will be a massive reduction in social conflict.  As the international community and experimental government of Afghanistan were never truly successful in rolling out modern legal systems for land use - such as deed and titles - we can expect there to be less conflict on these topics now, but simultaneously less documentation. The information layers - maps, records, audits - that drive modern software systems will dry up too. If the Taliban can broker working economic relationships with its regional neighbors, we will see some advances, but growth will be irregular from the combination of extreme cultural and social policies with inconsistent economic policies.